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Thursday, May 26, 2016

Op-Ed: RA’s Lake House Financial Fiasco, Terry Maynard, RestonNow, May 25, 2016

The following is a re-post of the Mr. Maynard's op-ed in yesterday's RestonNow.  

This is a commentary from Reston resident Terry Maynard. It does not represent the opinion of Reston Now.
As RestonNow readers know by now, RA has at least a $451,000 budget shortfall in its operating income and capital investment for renovations of the Tetra property to bring it up to County code and other standards that make it usable for its intended purposes.

If I am reading the Board of Directors and Fiscal Committee agenda packages for this week correctly, the so-called Lake House Working Group is asking for an additional $428,000 for renovation of the property in addition to the $259,000 —  increasing the projected renovation costs by 165 percent — apparently budgeted for Tetra property renovations this year although it is unclear that the previous sum was ever approved by the Board of Directors. (See the “Lake House” presentation to be given to the Board in the agenda packet, p. 11.)

That’s a total of $687,000 in renovations to be put into a building that, at a $2.65 million purchase price, was already a $1.5 million above fair market value. So if the supplementary capital budget is approved, through this year RA will have spent $3.35 million for a building worth about one-third of that. And that will probably not be the end of what of the investment needed to make the Tetra property usable.

At the risk of overusing a catchphrase, this is Tetragate with all that suffix implies. Everything about the Tetra purchase effort is wrong — and some of it possibly illegal — from the initial RA proposal to purchase the Tetra property through this week’s request for nearly another half-million dollars just to fix what’s wrong at Tetra.

The Tetra Referendum Information Guide (the voter’s guide) forecast that total “capital improvements” needed for the property would be the $259,000 to be spent this year. According to the guide, RA based that forecast cost figure simple-mindedly on an $80 per square foot cost (3,125 SF) plus $9,000 for work on the grounds. It is left unsaid why RA thought $80/SF would be enough to fix the Tetra fiasco.

No doubt one of the reasons RA thought the forecast that $80/SF would be sufficient is that RA implicitly assumed it would receive the building in good condition, yet in a RestonNow op-ed at the time of the referendum, I noted the poor condition of the building. In fact, RA told the appraisers to assume “deferred maintenance has been corrected.” By whom, the tooth fairy? This is the fantasy world RA and the Board of Directors was selling Restonians a year ago.

Instead, now the residents of Reston find themselves likely tagged with up to a $700,000 bill to bring the building up to standards and re-design its interior for RA needs. That’s a cost of more than $220 per square foot — a nearly three-fold increase in the now-estimated cost of renovating this growing money pit. It is also a cost of more than $30 per RA household this year.

How is RA going to hide that renovation cost and say the Tetra project did not affect RA assessment fees next year? What programs, staff, etc., will have to be cut to pay the Tetra bill? Already RestonNow reports early season swimming pool hours are being reduced. What’s next?

RA, specifically CEO Cate Fulkerson in her interview with RestonNow, attributed the huge capital renovation shortfall to unexpected operating revenue losses caused by the Tetra Group’s early departure.

Aside from the fact that the $428,000 request for added funds is for the capital fund for Tetra renovations, not the operating fund where Tetra’s revenues would have been recorded, RA’s mismanagement of the lease arrangement with Tetra was absolutely spectacular on so many levels.

Moreover, even if Tetra had remained another full year, the funding deficit now would still be some $300,000–more than double the total forecast (and possibly budgeted) costs of all required Tetra renovations.

Moreover, Fulkerson tries to save the Tetra effort and herself by saying “she scaled them (the renovation costs) down in an effort to save money,” according to the RestonNow article. Wow, she scaled them down from $1  million dollars to a mere $687,000 when RA and the Board told the community that the total cost would be $259,000.

Instead of a four-fold budget overrun, we are now looking at less than a three-fold overrun. That’s chutzpah; it is not responsible budget management. I doubt her household runs the same way, but now she, RA, and the Board are spending other people’s money — so who cares?

And the Tetra operating budget/outlook for 2016 is all over the place. Here is what I can find on operating revenues and expenses leading to net operating income/loss for the Tetra property in 2016:
  • The voter’s guide above anticipated $100,096 in facility revenues (net of program costs and including the rent back fiasco with Tetra) and expenses of $45,011 for a net operating income of $55,085 in 2016.
  • The so-called “Board Approved” budget for 2016 created on November 20, 2015, shows operating revenues of $105,110 and operating expenses ballooning to, get this, $203,364 for 2016. That’s a reported net operating loss of $98,254 in 2016 to be offset by a drawdown of Comstock’s $650,000 donation. What this document is saying is that (a) RA and the Board did not know of Tetra’s planned departure six weeks later or hid that fact in its budget approval process and (b) somehow found an additional $158,353 in operating expenses for 2016 which, because they are operating expenses, one would presume would carry on through 2017 and beyond. The only potentially legitimate explanation for the huge expense increase is including mortgage payments ($183,000 per year) as an operating expense, but neither the principal nor interest portion of the mortgage payment should be part of operating income. The alternative is that RA and the Board are really trying to hide one-time capital costs of Tetra’s renovation as operational expenses.
  • Then, in February 2016 (and other early 2016 meetings), the Lake House Working group reviewed a “DRAFT 2016 Lake House Budget.” (Wait, I thought the budget was “Board Approved” in November per above. Oh, never mind.) Anyway, that “DRAFT” budget anticipates $174,262 in operating revenues (and that is without Tetra lease income!) less a little over $7,139 in programming expenses for net facility revenues of $167,123. Other operating expenses total $71,465 leading to a “planned” net operating income of $95,658.
  • The latest incarnation of the operating budget in this week’s Board agenda package (p. 7) shows the “2016 Plan” (not the budget? a plan we’ve never seen?) calls for operating revenues of $58,000 and expenses of $62,000 for a net operating loss of $4,000. It also refers to a “Referendum” operating budget that foresaw a $20,000 net operating profit this year.   As detailed above, the only “referendum” pro forma we saw called for a $55,085 operating profit this year.
So how much does RA really expect the Tetra property to generate in operating income in 2016 now that we are more than one-third of the way through the year–+$55,000, -$98,000, +$95,000, -$4,000, or +$20,000???

From all indications, RA and the Board of Directors are playing a three-card monte con game with Restonians assessment fees, shifting revenues and costs to whatever category best fits their argument at the moment. In fact, I challenge RA to explain fully all the above budget/plan operating income inconsistencies in a manner reasonably consistent with generally accepted accounting practices (and there are others but this op-ed is already too long).

The entire Tetra project smacks of misfeasance if not malfeasance and, in my opinion, those responsible should be held accountable and measures taken to prevent further financial abuses. But none of that can occur unless and until the RA Board of Directors takes the time to examine thoroughly what has happened and, in particular, does not sweep the matter under the rug again by rushing immediately to approve the $428,000 budget supplemental that is being put before it for the first time this Thursday.

In this regard, I strongly support the recommendations laid out in a Reston 20/20 blog post published on Monday. To summarize, it states:
  • The RA Board of Directors should not approve the $430,000 budget addition request by the Tetra Working Group until a full independent investigation of the causes of the massive cost overruns has been completed by a panel of Restonians. No RA staff members, Fiscal Committee members, or members of the RA Board who served on the Board last year should be on the panel. It should have full access to RA financial records and communications about them.
  • Those senior RA staff members who played a significant role in the development of the referendum pro forma statements should not receive a performance award for 2016–nor should they have for 2015. At the minimum, this includes the CEO, CFO, and C/PRC plus other senior RA staff at the Board of Directors discretion.
  • Going beyond Tetragate to the broader picture, the RA Board of Directors must make public immediately the RA Annual Financial Report for 2015 and the auditor’s statement on that report. If they can not be produced immediately, RA needs to issue a full public statement on the causes of the delay and the adjustments that are required. These reports are now two months overdue and, according to recent information, may not be available to the Board (much less Restonians) before the June Board meeting.
Corporations worth hundreds of billions of dollars with billions in assets all over the world and hundreds of thousands of employees can produce an annual financial report in less than three months, not the six months RA is taking for what should be a routine annual task. The greater the delay, the greater the belief that something is seriously wrong with RA’s financial policies and practices.

As this op-ed highlights, nothing happening now in Tetragate ameliorates those concerns about the way RA and the Board are handling our money.

Monday, May 23, 2016

Tetra renovation nearly half a million dollars over budget this year alone.

UPDATE, Noon, May 23RA financial data through April 2016 just now available to us from RA's Fiscal Committee showindicates s that NO capital budget has been approved by the Board for the Tetra fiasco this year.  We are concerned that the Tetra expenditures so far have not been authorized by the Board of Directors.

In addition, the report shows an operating income loss of $35,987 already this year (four months).  The 2016 budget for this period shows an expectation of $31,008 in net losses through four months, so current losses exceed budget projections by almost $5,000.  As reported below,  the now year-old Voter's Guide projected a $55,000 net income this year while the latest budget proposal projects a $4,000 operating loss.


A presentation to be made to the RA Board of Directors this Thursday, May 25, 2016, shows that efforts to rehabilitate the Tetra "lake house" Restonians agreed to buy in a referendum last year are over budget by $451,000--approaching a half-million single-year deficit.  (The presentation comprises pp. 67-86 of this week's Board Meeting Agenda Packet.
  • $24,000 of that overrun is in operating income and expenses, which includes an unlikely high estimate for income this years (more than $100,000), so that number is likely to increase before the end of the year--even if the Board increases income by adding an after-school program (a $4,000 income "potential").  In short, RA foresees a $59,000 shift in net income from positive to negative during 2016.
  • The vast majority of the overage is, however, in the capital budget where the latest estimate skyrockets capital costs this year from $259,000 to $687,000, an increase of $428,000 or 165%!  
The net additional cost to Restonians this year will be $451,000 over this year’s earlier draft budgets for the Tetra fiasco.  The overage represents a 125% increase from the 2016 referendum proforma budget.  

But, in fact, the cash flow deficit is $486,269 based on the “final” RA pro forma statement in its Voters’ Guide sales pitch for approval of the referendum last spring, the difference coming from the $59,000 forecast cut in revenues.  Here is how the costs of the Tetra fiasco have escalated:

The most important numbers reported above are the added impact on cost per household:  RA voters foresaw an additional likely assessment fee cost of about $18 for this year alone, but not that additional costs per household for 2016 appears to be about $40.  The RA Board will have a hard time living up to its commitment during the referendum to not increase RA assessment fees in 2016 and 2017 due to Tetra costs without jeopardizing other activities or needed reserves.

Nonetheless, that hasn’t stopped the RA Tetra Working Group (aka “Lake House Working Group”) from calling upon the RA Board to add $430,000 to its 2016 budget from RA's Operating Fund this year to make of for the shortfall according to the RA Board materials.  No explanation is remotely offered for why an added capital cost should be taken from the RA operating budget.  In fact, that is absurd and dangerous:  There are good reasons why the two funds are kept separate in any business organization.

More importantly, if funding to cover the massive spending deficit is approved, the Tetra fiasco would add about $22 more per RA member household than was estimated just a year ago—before we voted. 

Watch for the substantial increase in your assessment fee next year!  And given the pathetic misinformation offered in the original referendum, we anticipate continuing large deficits in the Tetra fiasco project budget for several years—neither revenues nor operating and capital costs will come close to meeting their targets we believe, meaning Restonians can expect continuing large increases in their annual assessment fee to bail out the Tetra fiasco.

In a broader context, the obviously dubious referendum proforma financials make us wonder about RA’s overall financial condition. Some points to ponder:
  •  Where is RA’s 2015 Annual Financial Report?  This report is normally released to the public by May the following year.  The end of May is approaching and the report is not even on the RA Board’s agenda.  What is wrong with the report to cause the delay? 
  • Similarly, where is the auditor’s report on the 2014-2015 RA Annual Financial Report?  This annual report is usually completed in late March or April and presented in early May with the annual financial report.  Yet it is not available even at the late May date of theRA Board meeting.  What do the auditors have to say about RA’s accounting and its financial condition?
  • Why does the RA Board approved budget for 2016-2017 show that funds from the Comstock contribution in RA’s capital account will be used to offset expected losses of $98,254 in Tetra’s operating account in 2016?  Why is such a loss anticipated (this in November 2015) when the April 2015 Board-endorsed voter’s guide anticipates a 2016 net operating income of $55,085? Even the most recent iteration forecasts only a $4,000 shortfall in operating income for 2016.  How are such conflicting values possible?  What is the real state of operations at Tetra?
  • How can the December 2015 Fiscal Committee report show that Tetra’s 2015 budget and expenditures for the year were exactly equal—to the dollar?  Note 3 on the table below says the expenditures include “Loan Interest of $37,512 and property Taxes of $7,754.”  These are the only recorded expenditures.  Were there no other expenditures on the Tetra project?  Why does the report not include nearly $50,000 in costs the Fiscal Committee attributed to Corporate and Board expenses (see p. 1) that mostly relates to the Tetra Referendum expenses not budgeted for of $39,467 and Community Projects of $10,300 (sic)?” What was the real budget for Tetra in 2015—or were its costs simply a bucket to be filled?  If the Fiscal Committee is using Comstock’s capital contribution against operating costs, why are the capital costs of repairs and improvements on the Tetra property through December not included in this calculation? 
  • And the questions go on….

At this juncture, virtually every financial figure that RA has presented to the community concerning the forecasting and actual costs of remediating and programming the Tetra property for useful RA functions appear to be questionable.  Indeed, we do not know even the exact sums RA spent in 2015 on Tetra and where those funds came from (as well as the actual revenues) to make the Tetra property suitable for RA use.  Given the poor state of RA’s financial reporting on this project (and who knows what other financial discrepancies may exist), we recommend the following:
  • Those senior RA staff members who played a significant role in the development of the referendum proforma statements should not receive a performance award for 2016.  In fact, if the performance awards for 2015 have not yet been awarded, they should be rescinded.  This is called accountability for misleading, whether by ignorance, incompetence, or intent, Restonians on the costs of the Tetra property.  At the minimum, the CEO, CFO, and C/PRC should not receive bonuses.  We defer to the Board on what other staff members should not receive bonuses.  The scope of future additional reductions in staff bonuses should be tied to the accuracy of RA forecasts and completeness of public reporting on the costs of the Tetra project henceforth.
  • The RA Board of Directors should not approve the $430,000 budget addition request by the Tetra Working Group until a full independent investigation of the causes of the massive cost overruns has been completed.  Besides examining the failures in recent budget forecasting, this panel should re-calculate anticipated costs and revenues, operating and capital, through at least 2020.  No RA staff members, Fiscal Committee members, or members of the RA Board who served on the Board last year should be on the panel.  The panel should comprise Restonians with a reasonable degree of financial understanding.  They should have access to all RA financial transactions and other records pertaining to the Tetra project through the CFO.  
  • The RA Board of Directors must make public as soon as possible the RA Annual Financial Report for 2015 and the auditor’s statement on that report and explain the delay in their publication.  It is unconscionable that these reports have not already been made public and leave all Restonians to doubt the ability of RA to properly handle the management of their assessments fees. 
Not until the RA Board of Directors clarifies to the community the state of RA’s finances, especially the funding and costs of the Tetra project, does the Reston community have any reason to believe that RA’s financial reporting is accurate.  More seriously, the longer the delay in understanding these multiple unanswered questions, the greater the suspicion will be that RA records are being manipulated in an unprofessional manner.

Thursday, May 19, 2016

Washington’s sputtering office market has developers scrambling, WaPo, May 19, 2016

This Washington Post article by Jonathan O'Connell highlights the erosion of the suburban office market as many CRE firms look elsewhere to grow.  The "money line" in the article appears about half way through it:
“People are just not taking as much office space anymore,” (Savills Studley's Thomas) Fulcher said. “Even if companies are growing, they are not taking as much space.”
So rather than continue to try to lease the buildings, some of Washington’s most tenured firms are selling them off or moving on to greener pastures. . . .
So what is the situation now:
Record-high vacancies have become the new normal as employers curb their appetite for space and shift their attention to more urban locales. Some office buildings have been empty so long that several of the region’s stalwart development firms are tearing up their plans and selling off large chunks of property at bargain-basement prices in favor of pricier, more centrally located buildings.
Buildings began to empty during the recession, and they took another punch when the government shut down and federal spending slowed. The local economy began to pick up last year, but the recovery has been spotty, with construction cranes dotting the Washington skyline but absent from many parts of the suburbs, particularly areas far from mass transit. . .
The pain for Washington building owners is most acute in the suburbs, where vacancy rates have been on the rise for five years in a row and are about double that of the District. By one count, there are 151 spaces of 50,000 square feet or more available in Northern Virginia alone.
But downtown has not been spared; . . .
We have explained this evolving situation to Fairfax County Board Chairman Sharon Bulova, the rest of the Board of Supervisors, and the Planning Commission in numerous letters, but they all still are planning hundreds of millions of additional square feet of office space across the county, including some areas--such as the Richmond Highway Community Revitalization District--that do not even have access to Metro.  We received one rather pathetic response from the County Planning Staff that defended the County's far outdated standard of 300 gross square feet of office space per worker (reality is less than 200 SF/worker and as low as 100 SF/worker) and the outrageous County-sponsored taxpayer-paid office employment forecasts of GMU's Center for Regional Analysis that drove Tysons' and Reston's master planning efforts.  The same also occurred in Reston's Lake Anne redevelopment plan that has sense folded like a cheap suit.  It has happened in virtually every CRD, CBC, CRA, and TSA in the County as County leaders attempt to build and tax their way out of their poor budget management record.

Now the huge and intentional planning development errors are about to be augmented by an equally faulty one-size-fits-all zoning ordinance amendment (ZOA) that will irrevocably permit FAR 5 development in more than 20 County localities, including Reston's TSAs and Richmond Highway CRD.  That ZOA, left unamended, could permit tens of millions of additional square feet of office space in EACH locality--and that doesn't count Tysons which is in a category all its own. 

It is astounding to us at Reston 20/20 that County officials continue pursuing a policy course that will lead to more vacant office buildings, more congestion and pollution, and greater taxes on the County's residents in the face of overwhelming evidence that the office market has stagnated for the foreseeable future and the repeated judgments of experts in the CRE industry and amateurs like ourselves that this is the case. 

The County Emperor really is wearing no clothes, but none of its sycophants is willing to drive that point home.  In fact, developers keep demanding more density.  The farther we go, the worse the situation will become.

Sunday, May 15, 2016

SELLING IT: FCEDA goes off the deep end selling the County's office space growth.

An article in by Brian Trompeter, who regularly reports on Fairfax County business matters, details a presentation by FCEDA's Director of Real Estate Services Curt Hoffman to the Tysons Regional Chamber of Commerce entitled, "Commercial real estate continues headlong growth in Fairfax."  The article begins:
New office and mixed-use projects are being built like gangbusters in Fairfax County and the county’s economy remains formidable, a local real estate expert said May 11.
More than 2.6 million square feet of office space now is under construction, 83 percent of which has been leased in advance.

“It’s kind of like going to the car dealer and buying your car off the assembly line,” said Curt Hoffman, director of real estate services for the county’s Economic Development Authority, who briefed Tysons Regional Chamber of Commerce members during a breakfast meeting at the agency’s Tysons office. . . .
Companies are flocking to Fairfax County . . . Hoffman said. . . .
Wow!  How could life get any better for a developer and the County's economy and property tax revenue flows?

Just a tad of perspective shows how bogus the growth in the County's office space is.  FCEDA's data shows that, since 2006, the County has added more than 11.5 million square feet of office space.  At the same time, the amount of vacant office space has increased by an almost identical amount:  11.1 millions SF.  In fact, the amount of occupied office space in Fairfax County has increased by a measly 319.5 thousand SF--enough space to house 1,065 new office workers--112 new office workers per year--using the County's office space per worker planning assumption (300 GSF/worker).

The fact of the matter is that businesses are merely moving their employees from older buildings to new ones as FCEDA's mid-2015 data shows.  (Although it is now mid-May 2016 , FCEDA has not yet published its year-end 2015 data update.  CRE brokers routinely publish this office data quarterly with a one-month delay.)  Over the same period, the office space "available for relet" has grown by 10.9 million SF.  Available new office space has grown by less than 200,000 SF.

Against that backdrop, Hoffman called the County's 16.2% office vacancy rate (and that is "direct"only; "indirect" vacancies--unoccupied but leased space--adds two percentage points to that rate) is "near" the "healthy" range of 10%-15% range.  We call bullshit!  From a developer's perspective, that rate should be under 10%; the lessee wouldn't want to see it below 7% as rents would skyrocket.  In fact, over the 35 years the County has tracked its office market, the average direct vacancy rate has been 9.8%.  There is nothing healthy about an office market where the vacancy rate exceeds 10%--and the County's overall vacancy rate now exceeds 18%.

And office vacancy is becoming a larger problem for the County.  The office vacancy rate has more than doubled since 2006 from 7.7% to 16.5%.  Worse, it has grown every year since 2010 (then at 13.3%) when the national economic recovery began.  If the office market can't strengthen during a period of national economic growth, its future as a driver of growth in the local economy is very much in doubt, even with the arrival of the Silver Line in the Dulles Corridor.

One point Hoffman makes is that 73% of the current office space is becoming obsolete, meaning only that it is more than 20 years old--and “that’s the next market (replacing office space) we see taking off,” Hoffman said.  We disagree for several reasons.
  • Office job growth in the County has been and will continue to be slow, if not stagnant, thanks largely to Congress' inability or unwillingness to spend on larger government and government contracting.
  • Office space size per worker will continue to shrink.  Although the County continues to insist on using 300 GSF/office worker as its office space planning metric, the fact of the matter is that office space per worker is shrinking dramatically.  Some estimates say as low as 100 SF/worker.  We believe 200 GSF/worker is a comfortable estimate of current and future space per worker for at least a decade.  
  • Office-type jobs, especially business and technology work, are shifting to other markets for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the internet means that much of this business can be conducted from anywhere in the world.  
As a result, we anticipate that a significant share of the obsolete office building market, possibly a third or more, will be re-built (possibly years from now) as high-density residential as that market continues to show a relatively strong demand.

We appreciate that Hoffman's job is to sell the County's real estate, but he--and many others in County leadership positions--need to provide more credible presentations on the state and the direction of the County's economy, including its office market.  The continuing failure to provide credible information will itself lead corporations to move their businesses to other locations whose leadership is more candid about their business conditions and prospects.  

Here's the FCEDA data:

Countywide Office Space Trends: 1980–2015 (Square Feet)

Year Standing
Inventory 1
Rate (%)
Leased 2
Total Direct
1980 20,567,000 1.7 1,400,000 NA NA 343,086 279,539 63,547
1981 27,900,000 2.9 2,623,579 1,486,919 146,046 810,950 439,406 371,544
1982 30,750,000 4.5 2,639,313 1,193,946 451,186 1,374,534 866,906 507,628
1983 32,100,000 2.9 2,312,379 1,414,951 360,211 933,012 366,792 566,220
1984 35,100,000 7.3 3,318,178 1,706,050 562,293 2,558,566 2,018,716 539,850
1985 42,800,000 9.4 5,107,357 3,719,570 440,487 4,036,662 3,283,319 753,343
1986 48,700,000 9.4 5,889,741 3,908,799 339,682 4,555,065 3,119,637 1,435,428
1987 53,616,000 8.8 5,475,880 3,651,588 942,557 4,701,055 3,087,638 1,613,417
1988 58,073,000 10.8 5,014,401 3,046,598 1,004,913 6,263,547 3,818,738 2,444,809
1989 63,575,000 15.2 5,973,710 3,224,384 1,353,114 9,645,834 4,227,527 5,418,307
1990 67,139,000 18.3 5,006,377 2,202,932 2,424,145 12,255,516 5,118,433 7,137,083
1991 72,702,000 16.8 5,535,950 2,374,087 3,141,863 12,185,419 3,829,149 8,356,270
1992 73,056,000 14.8 4,854,778 1,433,064 3,421,714 10,788,508 2,652,612 8,135,896
1993 74,397,000 12.4 5,272,604 1,393,415 3,879,189 9,201,590 1,409,847 7,791,743
1994 75,562,432 9.9 6,306,117 1,290,152 5,015,965 7,490,605 651,098 6,839,507
1995 76,074,620 8.5 5,261,893 498,137 4,763,756 6,458,580 308,062 6,150,518
1996 78,265,573 6.2 7,040,085 1,316,827 5,723,258 4,908,932 77,775 4,831,157
1997 79,617,676 4.3 6,196,885 1,959,447 4,237,438 3,390,293 19,177 3,371,116
1998 82,088,287 4.1 6,991,158 3,810,783 3,180,375 3,392,909 531,855 2,861,054
1999 88,375,053 4.8 9,264,808 5,910,855 3,353,953 4,238,492 1,340,336 2,898,156
2000 93,563,753 3.5 12,750,968 6,918,762 5,832,206 3,236,371 1,007,213 2,229,158
2001 97,602,908 6.4 5,174,234 2,606,024 2,568,210 6,281,688 2,312,291 3,969,397
2002 100,912,347 12.1 7,648,790 1,022,910 2,631,385 12,176,938 3,291,394 8,885,544
2003 101,507,385 11.2 10,570,315 1,788,402 4,898,701 11,393,801 1,870,915 9,522,886
2004 102,117,697 8.6 10,969,819 1,762,757 6,028,830 8,764,801 919,191 7,845,610
2005 103,520,646 7.8 9,659,060 537,974 5,920,239 8,054,510 1,053,457 7,001,053
2006 105,054,801 7.7 10,805,683 2,249,866 7,569,360 8,115,057 1,155,235 6,959,822
2007 107,232,650 9.2 9,382,013 1,378,208 6,832,122 9,857,339 2,164,415 7,692,924
2008 111,189,301 12.1 9,976,277 1,808,055 7,146,620 13,422,946 3,419,220 10,003,726
2009 112,556,702 14 10,330,158 1,162,887 8,425,631 15,723,157 3,076,675 12,646,482
2010 113,191,835 13.3 13,586,158 1,317,120 11,590,346 15,091,196 1,926,139 13,165,057
2011 113,624,952 13.7 11,656,935 1,300,674 9,694,529 15,600,787 1,267,677 14,333,110
2012 114,056,515 14.4 10,717,111 1,251,127 8,833,486 16,454,250 1,039,607 15,414,643
2013 114,771,222 14.4 12,280,230 823,756 10,307,898 16,577,368 1,404,234 15,173,134
2014 116,238,615 16.3 9,833,053 521,971 8,711,025 18,897,111 1,498,179 17,398,932
2015 3 116,509,060 16.5 5,031,099 195,295 4,459,714 19,205,621 1,317,831 17,887,790

1.  Includes inventory outside submarket areas 1980-2000 only.

2.  ln some years, total leasing reflects the preleasing of buildings under construction and about to be constructed, as well as new and relet space.
3.  Through June 30, 2015.